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There are justified concerns but little empirical evidence about the implications of the use of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) in the business of human smuggling. The 
knowledge base on the use of ICT in human smuggling has rarely gone beyond the rather 
generic observation that the Internet and mobile technologies are available to and are used by 
both smugglers and migrants, and there is a concrete knowledge gap regarding the extent and 
the mode in which the use of ICT is integrated in the process of smuggling. In this paper, which 
is part of a wider research effort concerned with the role of the Internet in human smuggling in 
the European Union, we interrogate the outlook and implications of the use of contemporary 
mobile technology and of social media in the organisation and conduct of human smuggling to 
the United Kingdom (UK).  
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Introduction: situating ICT in human smuggling 
The Internet, social media, smart phones and a myriad of digital communications applications 
have created a world of unprecedented connectivity and have radically changed the ways 
people communicate, acquire information and organise their activity in everyday life. There is 
also a dark side to the Internet and the use of information and communication technologies 
(ICT), as there has been a shift towards crimes that are facilitated or enabled through ICT (e.g. 
online fraud, stalking and harassment, online grooming, various cyber-manifestations of 
‘organised crime’ and terrorism, etc.) (see Antonopoulos et al., 2018; Freiburger and Crane, 
2011; Lavorgna, 2014; Wall, 2007; Whittle et al., 2013). Increasingly, the threat arising from 
the use of ICT by criminals to either expand opportunity for conventional crimes or to engage 
in novel ones, features highly in policy and law enforcement (see, e.g., Europol, 2017a; 
Europol, 2017b; NCA, 2017). Equally, the scholarly investigation of these criminal forms has 
now become regularised and the knowledge base around them has been expanding (see, e.g., 
Jewkes and Yar, 2010). 
There are justified concerns but little empirical evidence about the implications of the use 
of ICT in human smuggling, a form of ‘organised crime’ that the public are strongly against 
despite their concerns about the well-being of irregular migrants. With regard to the facilitation 
of irregular migration, the use of ICT has more often than not appeared as a secondary 
consideration. Human smuggling as a business capitalises on the wider 'push' and 'pull' factors 
driving the clandestine cross-border flows of people. The established account of human 
 smuggling holds that as individuals and families take recourse to the services of smugglers in 
order to evade migration and border controls as they flee conflict zones, economic deprivation 
and poor life chances, they are exposed to grave and diverse types of harm and conditions of 
vulnerability, becoming prey to greedy, violent and highly organised smugglers (Shelley, 
2014). The narrative is further reinforced by law enforcement assessments of the multifaceted 
criminal threat smuggling networks pose, and of the prevalence of their activity: a recent joint 
Europol-Interpol report stated that the migration of more than 90% of those coming to the EU 
is facilitated, mostly by members of a criminal network. These agencies also expected their 
numbers to increase in the future in response to the control measures taken by countries along 
the migratory routes (Europol and Interpol, 2016). In light of this account, ICT appears as a 
sophisticated tool that adds to the versatility and reach of the smuggling business. Smugglers 
use the Internet, social media and also widely popular software applications to recruit 
customers, to arrange facilitation services, including transportation, accommodation and the 
provision of fraudulent travel documents, and also to make and receive payments. Conversely, 
the use of ICT by migrants may not only heighten the risk that they are exposed to the deceptive 
and predatory activity of the smugglers, but also that other users inadvertently become 
facilitators of the latter's business (Europol, 2017a; NCA, 2017). 
Much of the attention clandestine migration receives is underpinned by an acute awareness 
of the exposure to harm and conditions of vulnerability migrants may face en route to their 
destinations. The recent explosion of irregular migration flows from Asia and Africa to Europe 
(IOM, no date, a) has exacerbated these concerns: for example, in 2016 alone over 5,100 
people died or went missing en route in the Mediterranean (IOM, no date, b). There is no lack 
of accounts linking grave abuses and the deaths of migrants to the callous business methods of 
smugglers (e.g., Tinti and Reitano, 2017), and the hecatomb in the Mediterranean has gained 
media coverage precisely from this angle (e.g. Clarke-Billings, 2017). The widespread use of 
ICT is a cause for concern not only because it facilitates the use of the services of smugglers in 
order to evade migration and border controls, but also because it may facilitate the decision to 
use those services. As McAuliffe (2016) argues, the availability of ICT and the unprecedented 
levels of connectivity deserve focus as an important enabling factor in the irregular migration 
process as it may actively shape the ways in which people think and act about migration. 
The research presented and discussed in this paper addresses the question of the use of ICT 
in the migrant smuggling business. More specifically, we interrogate the outlook and 
implications of the use of contemporary mobile technology and of social media in the 
organisation and conduct of human smuggling to the UK. The findings presented here emerged 
from a wider research effort concerned with the role of the Internet in human smuggling and 
human trafficking with the aim to address the existing knowledge gap in a European context 
(see Di Nicola et al., 2017). Our specific focus on human smuggling has been dictated by the 
realisation that a considerable disparity exists between the evidence base regarding the role and 
implications of ICT in human trafficking and the available evidence and knowledge 
concerning human smuggling. It is often the case that these two types of crime are addressed 
simultaneously and in combination by research (Laczko and Thompson, 2000; UNODC, 2010; 
 Aronowitz, 2001). It is also true that there exists a possibility for overlap between the two, 
considering that the facilitation of irregular migration as defined by the second protocol of the 
Palermo convention may be transposed into slavery-like exploitation, as described in the first 
protocol of the same convention (United Nations, 2004), as part of the same process depending 
on the organisation of the criminal business. The two, however, should not be confused as the 
different goals and processes of each activity can be neatly distinguished, certainly in theory, 
but also, typically, in actuality (Salt and Hogarth, 2000). Due to the ascendancy of human 
trafficking as an issue, more is known about the role and use of ICT in the human trafficking 
business, particularly sex trafficking, and in this context, the literature appears to grow at a 
more certain pace (Di Nicola, Cauduro and Falletta, 2013; Latonero, Berhane, Hernandez, 
Mohebi and Movius, 2011; Latonero et al., 2012; Sykiotou, 2007; Myria, 2017; Sarkar, 2015). 
Conversely, the knowledge base on the use of ICT in human smuggling has rarely gone beyond 
the rather generic observation that the Internet and mobile technologies are available to and are 
used by both smugglers and migrants. Evidence about the use of mobile and information 
technologies by migrants in the process of migration does exist (Dekker and Engbersen, 2012; 
Fortunati, Pertierra and Vincent, 2013; Newell, Gomez and Guajardo, 2016; Zijstra and van 
Liemt, 2017), however, there is a concrete knowledge gap regarding the extent and the mode in 
which the use of ICT is integrated in the process of smuggling.  
The latter gap has two important dimensions. The first one relates to the way human 
smuggling is represented as an activity and its implications may be significant insofar as the 
use of ICT may appear unequivocally as an additional tool in the highly organised, 
sophisticated and ruthless operation of the business of smuggling. An emerging criticism of the 
established account of human smuggling is that it has tended to obscure important 
characteristics of the social organisation of the activity and the complex dynamic of the relation 
and interaction between migrants and smugglers (Achilli, 2015; Sanchez, 2016). Within this 
complex dynamic, the migrants' position cannot be tenably construed as passive and lacking 
agency, despite the fact that they can be, and often are exposed to serious abuse and harm. 
Rather, migrant smuggling is a relation that exists and unfolds in a market environment, and 
the smuggling transaction requires mutual information seeking and at least a modicum of 
negotiation and trust-building before it can take place. As Zhang, Sanchez and Achilli (2018: 
8) remark, the "binary predator-victim perspective rarely applies in a context where both 
migrants and smugglers actively engage in negotiating, vetting and trading".  
The second dimension regards how the use of ICT is integrated in the business model of 
smuggling, and more specifically how its use influences the discrete phases of the smuggling 
process, namely recruitment and transportation. Our main concern has been to assess the extent 
to which smugglers rely on ICT to organise and conduct their business, and also the kind of 
mobile technologies they rely on. A number of characteristics of smugglers as they emerge 
from the research literature are likely to be of significance in this respect. For example, 
smugglers tend to share national and cultural backgrounds with their clients and they tend to 
capitalise on familial or friendship ties; they also tend to be members of relatively 
marginalised, working class, low income communities; smuggling  requires no special or 
 technical skills, but rather social connections and resourcefulness (for an overview, see 
Sanchez, 2017). These characteristics may pose limits to both the availability and the actual 
usefulness of ICT resources to the conduct of the smuggling business—or to put it in different 
terms, the nature of the business may not require the extensive and intensive use of 
sophisticated ICT resources and methods that corporate service providers use.  
As regards the UK context, human smuggling remains an issue attracting considerable 
attention. Migration facilitated by human smugglers falls under the general category of 
"(illegal) immigration", which has consistently occupied a dominating position political 
agendas and appears to weigh heavily on the minds of the British electorate ( see, e.g., Swales, 
2016; Wilson and Kirk, 2018). Accordingly, law enforcement activity against human 
smuggling typically receives ample attention in the media (Gentleman, 2018; Barnes, 2018). 
The UK remains an important destination country as it retains a strong "pull" appeal, 
particularly for prospective migrants who have connections with established migrant 
communities in the UK and are faced with economic hardship and political turbulence in their 
home countries in Asia or Africa. The UK's National Crime Agency (NCA) firmly associates 
human smuggling with organised crime, as "organised immigration crime" involving criminal 
groups facilitating the journey to the UK at all stages of the process. Key locations for the 
smuggling business are Dover and also other ports with direct links to continental ports, which 
serve as intermediate hubs towards entry to the UK. The smuggling and other illicit businesses 
associated with it, such as the production of false travel documents appear to be well developed 
in the UK, and the authorities expect this business to grow, particularly in light of the tighter 
border controls implemented around Europe (NCA, 2017). Consequently, investigating the use 
and impact of ICT is highly topical, and our research addresses a key knowledge gap in this 
respect.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we proceed to 
explain in detail the methodology of our research. We have relied on one hand on a virtual 
ethnography component aiming to investigate the online context of human smuggling, and on 
the other we have conducted a series of ('offline') in-depth interviews with strategic informers, 
including individuals with experience in facilitating clandestine migration to the UK. Our 
findings session is organised according to the discrete phases of smuggling, recruitment and 
transportation. The concluding section includes a substantive discussion of our findings 
relating them to the extant knowledge base around the organisation of the human smuggling 
business.  
Methods 
The collection of primary data for this research has involved a mixed methods approach, 
involving methods suitable for the investigation of the role of the Internet and digital 
technologies in the business of human smuggling in the UK. This approach was also mandated 
by the exploratory nature of our work, given the absence of prior research on this particular 
topic.  
 The first component of our approach has been a UK-based virtual ethnography to acquire 
primary data, conducted between November 2015 and February 2017. As a research method, 
virtual ethnography extends the ethnographic field and situated observation from the 
examination of face-to-face researcher-informant interactions (Lenihan and Kelly-Holmes, 
2016) and “transfers the ethnographic tradition of the researcher as an embodied research 
instrument to the social spaces of the internet” (Hine, 2008: 257). In this regard, the virtual 
ethnographer immerses themselves in a virtual environment, observing and interacting using 
media relevant to that site for an extended period of time (Turney, 2008).  
As a starting point to initiate the virtual ethnography, online searches were conducted on 
Google to ascertain any popular websites and online classifieds advertising migration 
facilitation services. We used several keywords, such as “trips”, “smuggling to Europe”, 
“smuggling services”, “migrate to Europe”, “boat trips”, “yacht excursions”, “travel to 
Europe” “travelling to the UK”, “visa services” “Schengen visa” and “tours”, which we 
translated into Arabic and performed searches, on Google and other search engines. In 
addition, we also utilised social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, and used the 
search function on social networking sites, such as Facebook, to discover relevant pages, 
groups and people.  
The exploration of the smuggling business online requires researchers to take a more active 
role, and our approach has been to create e-mail accounts and profiles on social networking 
sites as well as web-forums. This operated as means to get access and study the activity on 
these sites. Our Facebook account allowed us to observe pages, groups and people that were 
advertising smuggling services, such as ways and means of transportation and aiding one’s 
entry into another country. We also attempted to engage in conversation with popular 
smuggling pages, and this more active participation yielded relevant data, which we shall 
highlight in the findings section. As part of this process, we obtained screenshots of images and 
text from websites, online classifieds, forums and social networking sites, and this content was 
subsequently analysed. Part of our virtual ethnography was also conducted on the 'Deep Web'. 
In the cybercrime literature and policy, the latter has become an important concern (see, for 
example, Chertoff, 2017).  
It is worth commenting further on some important methodological question of our virtual 
ethnography component, given our reliance on the data collected by means of this method. 
Some researchers have raised doubts about whether online efforts can yield empirical data that 
are trustworthy and representative, and have cited issues regarding authenticity, validity, 
reliability and online research methods (Davey et al, 2012; Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016). In 
particular, these concerns regard the assessment of the quality of information that has been 
acquired from web forums, given that they are communicative, unregulated, user-created and 
active social arenas; thus, the data collected may be inaccurate, and whether intentionally or 
not, misleading (Davey et al, 2012). Hall and Antonopoulos (2016) nevertheless highlight that 
data collected from online web forums and social media sites can produce rich empirical 
evidence from groups and communities that are normally hard to reach and can provide 
substantial insights into the ‘everyday life’ of these individuals and social groups. While some 
 information may be misleading or false, a general disregard of its quality is unwarranted, given 
that offline methods can suffer from similar issues. Additionally, there are good reasons not to 
dismiss cursorily the quality of the information posted on social media or online fora, given the 
seriousness of the information-seeking and the decisions it is intended to inform. Migrants 
choosing to enter the clandestine migration route have nothing to gain from sharing or 
exchanging inaccurate or specious information. 
The second key component of our research design has involved a more conventional, 
'offline’, approach. We conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with a variety of key actors in 
the UK, including non-governmental organisation representatives (NGOs) (n=3), law 
enforcement agents (LEAs) (n=9), experts on cyber-crime and/or human smuggling (and 
human trafficking) (n=4), and human smugglers (n=2). The two human smugglers were 
identified from a previous research study that one of the authors conducted on another 
manifestation of ‘organised crime’ (see Antonopoulos, 2008; Antonopoulos and Hall, 2016). 
In essence, snowball sampling was used with our initial participants introducing us to other 
(potential then) participants. One of the biggest advantages of this method of sampling is the 
‘informal’ way of identification of participants from hard-to-reach populations such as illegal 
entrepreneurs (Atkinson and Flint, 2004; Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2014). 
The interviews were conducted either face-to-face, by telephone or through Skype, with 
our participants’ responses being recorded with a digital voice-recorder. To ensure ethical 
compliance, we created informed consent forms that outlined the nature of the research project, 
and also the rights of the participants, as required by the ethics code of the British Society of 
Criminology. These forms were presented to the participants prior to the outset of the interview 
to sign, and once consent was obtained, we immediately commenced with the interviews. We 
used an interview guide as the basis for our questions, which was conditional to the particular 
participant we were interviewing. During the interview process however, these interview 
guides were not followed slavishly. 
With regards to the research conducted online, in most cases acquiring informed consent 
was attempted but unattainable due to the inconstant nature of the web (see also Hall and 
Antonopoulos, 2016). Moreover, although non-participant observation would be seen by some 
as unethical, this process was undertaken in publicly available sites. Within this context, 
certain systematic practices were put in place to offer a certain amount of privacy to users in 
our virtual ethnography. Following Davey et al.’s (2012) research into online drug fora, the 
practical ways in which this research endeavoured to protect online populations were by 
concealing the usernames of contributors to the sites included in the research. Throughout the 
study, as a way of maintaining the ethical values of social research, data from the virtual 
environment do not appear alongside the user name, and fora names are not disclosed. Ethical 
approval for both the online and ‘offline’ contexts of the research was granted by the principal 




Findings: ICT and the smuggling phases 
  
Recruitment 
The overwhelming majority of our data relating to the role of digital technologies and the 
Internet in the facilitation of human smuggling to the UK were captured from social 
networking websites, particularly Facebook. We found that social networking sites are a key 
instrument for migrants and smugglers to share information about travelling routes, the 
occurrence of border closures, transportation services and involved costs of arranging trips. We 
identified numerous active and highly popular smuggling-related accounts and group pages on 
Facebook. Particularly, group pages can facilitate variable levels of access to information 
shared by members of the group depending on their privacy settings—for example, a group 
page can be open to all Facebook users to join, and conversely, closed group pages require an 
administrator’s approval of the one's request to join.  
According to one interviewed expert, communication and the broadcasting of important 
information, such as which countries are easy to enter, where borders are open to travel through 
and where they have been closed, may influence heavily the decision-making processes of 
migrants and consequently the recruitment phase of smuggling: 
It [the Internet] would be spreading news, if it's easy to get through the process of an 
asylum application, the news spreads very quickly, for example 'it's more relaxed in 
this country or the other country', then people will plan destinations accordingly. 
Again, it's communication, it's how you spread the news (Interview with Expert 2). 
Indeed, Facebook pages advertised transportation services, the sale of counterfeit travel 
documents such as passports, visas and identification papers including driving licenses, as well 
as general discussions of the navigation of paths into the UK, as well as in wider Europe. 
Individual users may also share their personal experiences: for example, we came across an 
individual's account and photos of brutal attacks by border guards and guard dogs on migrants 
travelling via a land route attempting to cross through the Bulgarian border. On another site we 
came across Turkey-based smugglers, who advertised transportation services to Europe by 
highlighting danger and urging potential clients to connect via the Viber app (a Voice over IP 
and messaging application for smart phones).  
We gained access to group pages by joining them or following them and we also accessed 
the information on the pages of some accounts (that were obviously not personal in the strict 
sense) by adding them as "friends". Thus we were able to receive notifications of new postings 
and updates relating to transportation journeys, the advertisement of new trips, usually 
dependent on suitable weather conditions, and the sale of passports or other such counterfeit 
documents. As these pages feature content relating to illicit activity, we observed that the 
names were changed constantly, possibly as a means of avoiding detection. Other accounts 
were closed after a short life span. Just like the redirection of potential recruits to VoIP 
applications, the creation and termination of social media accounts on a regular basis appears to 
be a precaution against detection. As one of the smugglers we interviewed remarked: 
I closed them [Smuggling pages on Facebook] all. There are not there anymore. There 
 is no point in having them. I had many because I used each page for a little bit and 
then I opened another one and so one. For protection, you know. You don’t want to be 
stable in this business, you need to ‘move’ again and again for protection (Interview 
with Smuggler 2).  
Our interviews with human smugglers indicated that the Internet was an important tool in their 
smuggling activities, in particular the recruitment phase to advertise their services. 
Nevertheless, there is significant variation in the extent to which the medium is used: 
Yes, I have used the internet many, many times! Internet along with mobile phones, of 
course, is the best to have business from a distance! I have been helping people to 
come to the UK since 2002. I enjoy being a kacakçi [human smuggler]. […] I used 
Facebook before I come to England for a year, a year and a half. I had many pages in 
face book and advertised my services. Transportation, travel to Europe, good prices, 
best service (Interview with Smuggler 2).  
Yes [using the Internet] but not as much as you may think. Most of my business in the 
beginning [recruitment] happens by people [offline]. People know you, they know 
what you do, they know you are a kacakçi [smuggler], and they come to you and tell 
you what they want. … I don’t trust the internet so much anyway because you never 
know who might be watching … My business partner in Kurdistan will send 
messages to friends, e-mails and ask “do you know anyone who wants to go to 
Europe? If you do, tell them to send me a message at so and so…” (Interview with 
Smuggler 1).  
It is important to mention that Smuggler 1 emphasised that often, recruitment took place 
offline, as people who knew them either directly or indirectly, through friends or relatives, and 
their occupation as a smuggler would initiate contact in person and make enquiries on how to 
travel to the UK for themselves or for their relatives. According to Sanchez (2017), those 
seeking to migrate explore potential options usually by consulting friends and relatives who 
have made and undertaken successful smuggling journeys, often meeting with smugglers in 
person or chatting via telephone and may meet several smugglers until a suitable option is 
chosen. Moreover, a small number of smugglers manage to form a client base and positive 
reputation attesting to the reliability, degree of communication throughout the journey and the 
quality of the transportation, all of which contribute to the duration of a smuggling enterprise, 
enabling smugglers to generate and conduct business with prospective customers. 
A consistent and important finding pertaining to the recruitment phase of human smuggling 
was that some pages, particularly the ones that were more active and popular, would expose 
fraudulent smugglers, who were advertising deceptive transportation services. These posts 
would often be very lengthy, detailing the unscrupulous smuggler’s name, nationality, the 
country and city they were operating in, and how they had defrauded their victim or victims, 
particularly in regards to payment. For example, a popular and active smuggling page on 
Facebook entitled “Uncle Aziz” exposed fraudulent smugglers deceptively claiming to offer 
 transportation services to Europe and the UK, by exhibiting screenshots of Viber chats, in 
which travel arrangements were discussed. In many cases, a photograph of the denounced 
person was also attached to the post. Additionally, some people would then comment on the 
post, to confirm that they too had been deceived by the smuggler, and would strongly urge 
others to be aware and use caution. On the basis of the popularity of these pages that would 
routinely uncover deceptive smugglers, it would not be unreasonable to think that they function 
as a potentially very effective form of benevolent recruitment, by way of demonstrating a 
concern about the safety of the potential migrants of raising awareness about dangerous 
swindlers masquerading as smugglers. By instilling confidence in their own services, the 
owners of these Facebook accounts would thus encourage migrants to arrange transportation 
through these pages instead.  
Transportation 
We found a large number of Facebook pages that were actively advertising transportation 
services, including boat, yacht or flight trips and to a lesser extent, land routes, where the 
journey would be made on foot to various countries in Europe. One popular travel route was 
from Turkey, particularly from the cities of Izmir and Mersin to various islands in Greece, and 
then utilising various routes to and within an assortment of European countries to the 
destination of the UK. For example, we came across a Facebook page called "Smuggled to 
Europe", advertising transportation services, and including a screenshot captured from Google 
Maps that demonstrated a transit route from Turkey to the destination of the UK. One of our 
interviewed smugglers mentioned that a relative of theirs would advertise the sale of European 
passports to facilitate transportation and entry to the UK:  
My cousin is in France and in his Facebook account has a post about European 
passports. With one of those you get to England with no problem. You just need the 
money, 800-1000 euros is OK. [On being showed the particular Facebook account, 
including the advert/post translated from Arabic to English] “Want to buy passport, 
ID, visa and driving license with no hassle? We make really high quality documents 
for travel to European countries. We sell only best documents. Guaranteed success. 
We make perfect passports for UK, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, USA, Canada. 
Very competitive prices. Discount available for families. The passport can be ready in 
5 days. For more information, send an e-mail: jXXXX@gmail.com / tel. 0033 2 
99xxxxxx” (Interview with Smuggler 2). 
Typically, these pages include photographs of the particular means of transport, usually of 
boats, cruise liners and yachts, complete with information on their size and dimensions, as well 
as stating the duration of the journey. In addition, these posts also outline the prices charged for 
the routes and journey, and include a contact number to make further enquiries. Moreover, 
many of these pages extensively posted photographs and videos of “successful” trips made, 
both during the journey, and after the destination had been reached. This is unambiguously a 
 marketing technique aiming to encourage potential customers and boost their confidence in the 
service provided.  
Forms of 'customer feedback' also typically appear on these pages. For example, many 
pages featured a box (webpage frame) that attested to how quickly the persons behind these 
pages would reply to messages. Some of the pages were marked as “very responsive”, meaning 
their owners would reply within an hour, and others as “extremely responsive”, indicating that 
the response to messages would be returned in minutes. Some pages also post status updates of 
successful journeys made, and alert potential migrants of adverse weather conditions. New 
routes into Europe are also advertised using screenshots of Google Maps indicating distance as 
well as providing information on how to travel through the route without being discovered by 
border guards or officials.  
An interesting observation that we were able to make on numerous occasions regards the 
interplay between various forms of technology, namely between the Internet and mobile phone 
applications. We have already mentioned Viber, and the alternative WhatsApp application is 
also widely used. When smugglers use social media and these applications in combination, 
Facebook operates as a gateway. The purpose of the Facebook page is to introduce potential 
migrants/customers to services through advertisements, while further communications, most 
likely to arrange transportation journeys and discuss payment are diverted to WhatsApp and 
Viber, usually through the telephone numbers that are listed in the post. This was the usual 
method reported by our interviewed smugglers: initial questions are answered through private 
chats in Facebook, but are then continued on mobile phone, so that further arrangements can be 
made between the smugglers and the clients, or between smugglers working alongside other 
smugglers: 
This [private chats in Facebook] was very rare after they contacted me. Most of 
clients gave me a call; I offered a telephone number in the post, so they called me and 
made all arrangements. There are a few of, usually very young, people who will send 
messages in private chat in Facebook. Young boys who are online the whole time and 
are interested in going to Europe and they may want to ask something before the 
arrangements are made. You know to ask whether they can come with less money. 
Maybe because they don’t have a phone, I don’t know. Most of the people called me 
and I answer any questions they have (Interview with Smuggler 2).  
I just use mobile phones to communicate with my partners in places like Istanbul and 
Izmir. This is how we take care of business. Once the people get to Greece, there are 
others who take care of them. I also talk to people I know about the travel and advise 
them what to do when in Istanbul because Istanbul is very big and people from my 
town find it difficult. (Interview with Smuggler 1). 
Primarily when it comes to the smuggling of Asian and African migrants, all smuggling groups 
and/or individuals ‘cooperate’ (without even considering it), in an attempt to bring the bulk of 
migrants from Asia and Africa to the United Kingdom (as well as other countries of Western 
 Europe). This takes place via a smuggler-to-smuggler approach that does not allow irregular 
migrants to be lost (see Içduygu and Toktas, 2002). Smugglers often unwittingly ‘collaborate’ 
with other smugglers while not known to one another, as they may live and operate in different 
villages, cities, regions, and countries (see, for example, Sanchez, 2017). In the event of arrest 
of one of the smugglers, or if the chain is sometimes broken during the journey (e.g., due to 
policing operations), other individuals, groups and networks that have no connection with the 
smugglers of the initial stage, take over in the smuggling of migrants. Information and 
communication technologies are instrumental at this part. Smugglers and their clients appear to 
have a preference for basic mobile phones for communication purposes, alongside social media 
and to recruit and guide clients. As Sanchez (2017) points out, this usage is better understood as 
a reflection of the affordability and availability of mobile technology, rather than as a marker of 
the technological sophistication of smugglers. Significant sections of the communications that 
place between various smugglers working together take place through mobile technology, 
including phone calls, text messages (SMS), as well as WhatsApp and Viber and social media 
websites. These undertakings, when executed successfully in coordination, will guide clients to 
their final destination.  
As a means of a more active engagement with this aspect of the virtual ethnography, we 
tried to contact some of the more popular smuggling Facebook pages, in particular those who 
were likely to respond swiftly to messages. Our aim was to find out whether there were 
particular pages or smugglers and ‘brokers’ that would be able to provide information on ways 
of transportation and routes taken to travel, specifically to the United Kingdom. We contacted 
these pages with a simple inquiry of how it would be possible to travel to the United Kingdom, 
from Syria as well as the costs involved as a lone traveller for the journey. As a means of 
initiating conversation, we used an online translation tool to translate text to Arabic, and then 
proceeded to send messages to the pages via Facebook’s web (and desktop)-based Messenger 
feature. Whilst some of these pages did indeed provide swift responses, the majority of the time 
we were informed that further information could only be discussed through mobile phone 
applications such as WhatsApp and Viber, with contact numbers provided to do so. However, 
given that these conversations would be conducted entirely in Arabic, it was impracticable to 
pursue this line of investigation within the framework of our research. Nevertheless, creating 
and setting up a Facebook account yielded a voluminous set of data, as we were able to gain 
more access and insight into previously inaccessible content, such as relevant smuggling 
groups and pages.  
The smugglers that we interviewed also remarked on the use of the Internet, in particular 
social media and mobile phones as being key mechanisms in the logistics of the transportation 
process, specifically keeping in contact with the clients during the transportation journey, as 
well as the arrival of their clients to the destination and, importantly, the arrangement of 
payment. Irregular migrants (or their families that very often see the facilitation of their 
migration as an investment) pay the full or at least 50% of the total smuggling fee in advance. 
This 50% is in most occasions used towards paying important actors of the journey before the 
actual journey starts. The rest of the fee is paid upon the migrants’ arrival in the destination 
 country. Often, advance payments are made to a middleman, such as a trusted and prominent 
member of the local community, who then forwards the payment to the organiser once the 
migrant's facilitated journey has been completed: 
Once we have a customer, I have used Facebook and I have also been using e-mail in 
order to take care of details with regards to the details of the trip from Kurdistan to 
Istanbul and from Istanbul to Izmir, from Izmir into the Greek islands. Sometimes, 
especially when I know the person I helped to travel e-mails and Facebook are used to 
let me know that they have reached the destination and to sort out any outstanding 
money issues. We have to get paid too! You know, where to go and who to pay and so 
on. Sometimes there are problems any people are getting lost, they cannot find a place 
to stay, they cannot find someone to talk to, etc. etc. etc. the travel is full of problems 
and you cannot do this without e-mails, and phones (Interview with Smuggler 2). 
Additionally, one of our interviewed smugglers would also provide information on available 
accommodation, and where to charge phones during journeys when the duration of the trip to 
the destination country was uncertain: 
In most of the places people have to stay [transit points], they need a house, a bed to 
sleep on. The best way for them to know what is there, cheap places to stay, is 
Facebook. You can find a hotel anywhere in Europe but the problem is that they are 
very expensive. When they travel for months or even years they want to spend as little 
money as possible. You never know how long the trip will last, and in some place they 
ask them for a lot of money, 5 euros for a bottle of water, 10 euros for a sandwich, and 
some people Greece, in Italy, in France, they ask you 20 euros to let you recharge 
your mobile battery.  So in the internet, in Facebook, you can advertise 
accommodation for as little as 10 euros a night. When people travel, they are always 
on their mobiles to find the cheapest solutions to their everyday problems… my 
cousin does the same for cheap rooms. [On being showed a relevant post on Facebook 
on available accommodation in France] “Cheap rooms in Calais. 15 euros per night, 
TV included. Common toilet with shower. Clean. Available for families. Discount 
negotiable. For more information, tel. 0033 2 99xxxxxx”] (Interview with Smuggler 
2). 
ICT in human smuggling: not a technological revolution in crime 
The purpose of our study has been to address an important knowledge gap with regard to the 
use of ICT in the business of human smuggling to the UK. We have found that mobile and 
communication technologies have a role in the practice of smugglers, just as they do in the 
strategies of individuals entering the routes of clandestine migration. Migrants use ICT to seek 
information about routes and the conditions prevailing in them, as well as information about 
the services that smugglers make available to facilitate their journey. Equally, smugglers take 
 advantage of the speed and directness of the medium, whether Internet accessed via smart 
phones or more conventional mobile telephony in order to advertise their business, reach a 
larger number of potential customers and possibly gain an advantage over the competition. 
This general outlook unremarkably mirrors the patterns of merchant and consumer online 
strategies and behaviour in the licit travel and other services business.  
It is important to recognise immediately the limitations of our research with regard to the 
extent to which virtual ethnography has enabled us to obtain an accurate and rich 
representation of the reality of smuggler and migrant practices in its entirety. While we have 
been able to capture the online behaviours and interactions of members of the two groups, and 
we also have been able to probe the online behaviour of smugglers in terms of how they present 
themselves online and respond to queries, important demographic information regarding 
smuggler and migrant backgrounds and the social composition of the population that 
participates in the online universe of the smuggling business has remained uncertain. In other 
words, a virtual ethnography of human smuggling can capture the behaviours of those who are 
in fact able to access the Internet and social media, or even have access to the mobile 
technologies that mediate that access. 
The above limitation of our study already points to the key message emerging from our 
findings. The question of access to ICT is not inconsequential. Firstly, it should not be readily 
assumed that access to ICT is ubiquitous in the sending countries, as Internet diffusion 
continues to be low in the developing countries (World Bank, 2016), and, in addition, those 
who decide to join the routes of clandestine migration are likely to come from disadvantaged 
backgrounds even in these already digitally disadvantaged countries (Sanchez, 2017). One the 
other hand, while some smugglers may indeed take a more ambitious approach and attempt to 
reach out to potential clientele via the Internet and social media, many others may not be able 
or interested to do so. This may be due to objective limitations regarding the location at which 
they operate, the lack of ICT infrastructure or equipment, the opportunistic nature of their 
involvement in the process, and, of course, the very illicit nature of the activity, since the use of 
ICT increases the possibility of detection by the authorities (see, for example, Moore, 2007). 
These limitations are also amplified by the fact that, at its core as an activity, human smuggling 
is not technology-intensive, but rather it is a small scale operation requiring practical skills, 
knowledge of locations and routes and flexibility in decision making (Andreas, 2000; Carrera 
and Guild, 2016; Sanchez, 2016; Spener, 2004, 2009; Zhang, 2007).  
The upshot of the above observations is that one should take precautions against the 
temptation to treat ICT and its impact on the business of human smuggling as an unambiguous 
major development and a new type of criminal threat. The ambivalence towards the use of ICT 
that our interviewed smugglers expressed in the accounts suggests that they are more likely to 
take a pragmatic view of technology and its usefulness as a means depending on the context of 
their business, and less likely to perceive and engage with ICT as a core element of that 
business. This would suggest that, even though the transformative effect of ICT on 
contemporary life cannot be understated, the ongoing debates regarding whether it engenders 
new types of criminal activity or facilitates old ones (see, e.g. McCusker, 2006; Levi, 2001; 
 Savona and Mignone, 2004) cannot be resolved abstractly. Rather, what is required is an 
examination of the extent to which ordinary criminal activity is adaptive to technological 
change: 
"It is important to distinguish new crime from new methods. To take one common 
case, frequently “computer crime” is singled out as a prime new area of concern. But 
it really boils down to a series of traditional criminal acts . . . that happen today to be 
assisted by the use of computers. The crimes remain the same. The only difference is 
the technique used to commit them, and the ability to do them from much further 
away than was commonly the case" (Naylor, 2000: 4; see also McQuade 2011; Hall 
and Antonopoulos, 2015). 
Equally, our findings regarding the use of ICT by migrants planning or undertaking the 
journey, that is, the prospective and actual clientele of smugglers, strongly suggest that the 
question of vulnerability cannot be resolved abstractly. To state this differently, the migrants' 
online activity that our research captured confirms the real risks involved in facilitated 
clandestine migration, but also revealed a dimension that would preclude any abstract 
conceptualisation of the migrants' position as passive and vulnerable because of the use of ICT. 
In fact, it seems more plausible to approach ICT (and the emergence of online information 
seeking and exchange that it allows) as an enabling factor indeed (McAuliffe, 2016), but one 
that potentially empowers migrants and offers a qualified layer of protection against from the 
predatory activity of the more opportunistic and unscrupulous smugglers. Of course, the 
availability and effectiveness of this layer is mediated by the persisting inequalities of online 
access, and even when these have been explored and taken into account, more research is 
needed to establish the extent to which ICT modifies qualitatively the conditions under which 
the smuggling transaction is negotiated and materialised. Nevertheless, the ability to actively 
vet smugglers, gain information on the kind of services they offer and the conditions of the 
route appears to be a net positive development. As such, on the basis of our findings we would 
advise against an aggressive over-policing of the smuggling-related online communities, 
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